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STATE OF UTAH 
VINAL MILLETT, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
GLORIA LANGSTON, 




STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The problem involved in this lawsuit is relative to the nature 
of the business relationship between the Plaintiff, Vinal Millett, 
and the Defendant, Gloria Langston, concerning the erection, 
financing, running and other such matters of a trailer court in 
the City of Moab, Utah. There was no written agreement be-
tween the parties and their testimony shows a variance in what 
they apparently understood to be their business arrangements. 
Some points are basically clear and undisputed however. 
In April and May 1954, Vinal Millett (Respondent in this 
Court and Plaintiff below) discussed trailer court possibilities 
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with several people, among whom was his niece, Gloria Langston, 
(who is the Appellant here and the Defendant below). No 
definite details had been reached at the time of these discussions 
' 
other than the general plan of such a business undertaking, and 
the City of Moab was the place located because at that time it 
was a scene of business activity stimulated by Uranium Ore 
Mining in the Area. The problem is: What was the arrangement 
or the agreement between the Plaintiff and Defendant for the 
building of a Trailer Court Business? If there was an agree-
ment, what were the terms of the same? Was such partnership 
ever terminated, and if so, is there any money due and owing 
by either party to the other? This business venture was Plain-
tiff's idea. 
Plaintiff was a carpenter, who, because of the weather in 
the Salt Lake City Area, was seasonally unemployed and while 
so unemployed was receiving unemployment compensation. 
With time on his hands he was planning and formulating a 
Trailer Court Business in the Moab area. They had discussed this 
with several people (line 28, page 35) and finally the matter 
was discussed with Vinal Millett's niece, Gloria Langston here-
in, (line 7, page 3 6) they were searching for someone to put 
up the money to finance such a venture and Vinal Millett was 
to go down there and do the carpentry and construction \\·ork 
and to run the business (line 1, page 36). Plaintiff testified that 
the arrangements between the parties \vere that the Defendant 
\Vas to provide the financing and the Plaintiff \\·as to do the 
building (line 2 3, page 3 7); furthermore the Plaintiff failed to 
put up adequate tnoney to con1plete the matter in a hurry and 
it was necessary to build the project using funds derived from 
the business to assist in the expenses of further construction. 
On this b~1sis, the Defendant did not live up to her part of the 
arrangcn1ents ben,·een the parties. 
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The Plaintiff remained in Moab for a period of 15 months 
from May, 1954, until July, I955, during which time he built 
and constructed the Trailer Court called the RIVER SANDS 
TRAILER COURT, doing all of the work himself that he 
could do, with the exception of some electrical and plumbing 
.work (line I I, page 38). Because of the close family ties, and 
not anticipating problems, very poor records were kept by the 
parties involved (line 25, page 38) (line 2, page 40). 
The Plaintif~ testified that they had about $240.00 income 
per month from the operations of the Trailer Court and that 
out of this $240.00 he was paying bills for materials (line ~~ 
page 40) (line 20, page 4I) and that he used approximat~ly $I.oo 
per day for his own personal use (line 22, page 41 ). In addi-
tion to this money, for his own keep, he had $45 .oo per month 
paid on his car for eight payments and also $2o.oo or $25.00 per 
month sent to Plaintiff's wife. Upon completing the construc-
tion, the Plaintiff suggested to the Defendant that a woman 
could now run the Court and asked her if she would want to 
do it (line 30, page 42); and further that the Plaintiff \vould 
come back in the fall, after he had had a couple of months rest 
away from the property (line 7, page 4 3). 
Apparently the business arrangements between the Plain-
tiff and Defendant varied and "grew like Topsy". The original 
arrangements was that they intended to rent land and afterward 
they decided to buy inasmuch as nothing could be rented (Ex. 
2 deposition of VM 4: R. 37 ). 
About May 2oth, I 9 54, the Defendant purchased 5 acres 
of land from Frank Peterson for $I Ioo per acre, paying $I 2oo 
down and $I oo per month thereafter (pages 48 and 8 I ) . The 
Plaintiff contended that he was to have an interest in the land, 
but that the Defendant took title in her name alone. Later 7 Y2 
acres more at $I oo.oo more per month was added. 
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In the beginning, apparently, Ira Millett, brother of the 
Plaintiff, was to be a partner in the matter on a Va basis, because 
of supplying material for this undertaking. This arrangement 
was changed by the Defendant who paid approximately $4o.oo 
to Ira Millett for the lumber that he provided, which he claimed 
was worth $I I 57 .20. From the testimony of the parties, it was 
evident that the Defendant on visits to Moab would have an 
accounting on the collections made and receive the proceeds that 
were available. 
Plaintiff testified that when he left, he intended to return 
and that he left tools down there, taking of course, his personal 
effects with him when he left. (Deposition VM page 30.) 
The audit or accounting rendered by Mr. Vance of Ernst 
and Ernst Accounting Firm is of no practical value because it 
was not a certified audit and it was impossible to verify or 
certify the correctness of the accounting and the items in the 
accounting (line I, page I48) ( I49, line 20) (line 27 page I49) 
page I54 line I7) (line 23 page I54) (page I55 line 23) (page 
I 56 line I 3 ) (page I 6o line 3 o) ( I 6 I lines I and 5) ( I 6 2 line 2 8) 
(page 1 64 line 5) (page I 64 line 2 9) (page I 66 line 2 3 to line 
30). 
The income tax of Defendant filed before this action was 
started is the best evidence of the profit from the operation of 
the business inasmuch as it is self evident that it is human nature 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
. THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
FINDING OF THE COURT THAT THE PLAINTIFF 
AND DEFENDANT ENTERED INTO A PARTNERSHIP 
AGREEMENT FOR THE CONSTRUGriON AND OPER-
ATION OF A TRAILER COURT. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING THAT IN 
JULY, 1955, THE PARTIES HAD AN ACCOUNTING AS 
TO INCOME RECEIVED AND EXPENDITURES MADE 
AS OF THAT TIME WITHOUT THE BUSINESS 
ASSOCIATION OF THE PARTIES BEING DISSOLVED 
AND TERMINATED. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN MAKING DISTRI-
BUTION OF THE PARTNERSHIP ASSETS IN THE 
MANNER ADJUDGED. 
POINT IV. 
THE JUDGEMENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE FIND-
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.. ARGUMENT . 
. ·- . . ' 
POINT .I . 
.. THE EVIDENCE·IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
FINDING· OF TH·E ·COURT THAT THE PLAINTIFF 
AND DEFENDANT ENTERED INTO ·A PARTNERSHIP 
' . 
AGREEMENT FOR THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPER.;; 
A TION OF A TRAILER COURT. 
The Trial Court found from. the evidence that: 
· ~- " I . Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a partner-
. ship agreement for the Construction and running of .a 
Trailer Court" (R~ I 87). . · 
. . . . 
. . .. In reviewing the decision of a trial court · this Court has 
stated that it will not overturn ·the ·decision of the T~ial Court 
unless "it is manifest that the Trial Court has misapplied proven 
facts or made findings clearly against the weight of the evi-
dence." Ofara vs. Findlay,_6 Ut. 2d,.Io2, 396 P. znd 1073. 
From the evidence presented below, it is quite clear that 
the intention of the parties \Vas to . venture into the trailer 
court business in an attempt to realize a .pr.ofit from. their efforts. 
In HANSEN vs. BOGAN, 127 Oregon 399, 272 P. 668, 
the Supreme Court of Oregon defined a partnership, by quoting 
fron1 Chancellor Kent as follows: 
· · · ''A contract of two or more competent- persons to 
place their money, efforts, labor and. skill, or som_e . of 
all of them in la"·ful con1merce or business and to divide 
the profit and share the loss in certain proportions." 
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In addition it is well established that: · 
"There need be no express agreement that each 
party shall bear a share of any losses which may occur 
in the business since as a legal consequence, one partici-
pating in the profits of a partnership is held liable for a 
share of the losses." 
20 RCL 826, Bentley vs. Bossard, 33 U. 396, 94 P. 736. 
The testimony of each party expressly shows that a partner-
ship was ~created by their participating in the creation of oper-
ation of the Trailer Court. The Plaintiff testified as follows: 
"A. Well after she kicked my brother out, we was 
all going thirds, see. She kicked him out and then she 
says, 'Well, now you and I will split this and go half.' 
She says 'Half of everything is yours.' (Dep. V.M. P22~ 
ex 2). 
"Q. Did you understand that half meant one-half 
of the property, of the real property. 
"A. Half of everything. 
''Q. As of what time, as of the time you left or 
as of the time - as of now or as of the time of the 
purchase? 
"A. As when I left and before and all times. 
"Q. So you claim-
"A. I am half owner. 
"·Q. You claim you own one half of the property 
as it now exists? 
"A. Yes. She has been sending word through her 
mother to me at least once a week for the last six months 
since I entered this Court and says, 'Now, you tell hirr~ 
that I am going to bargain. I am giving him half of 
everything.' She is just trying to get me to cancel it. 
"Q. Do you have any such statement in writing? 
"A. No. How would I get it in writing when it is 
handed over the phone? (Dep. V. M. page 2 3 1, ex. 2). 
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"Well, it was on thirds when we started, and then 
after she released him, then she says, 'I will give you 
half' (Rec. P. 45). -
The Defendant testified as to the terms of the partnership 
agreement as follows: 
"Q. Now if this developed into a good business 
venture that would make money, were you to get your 
original investment back. 
"A. I was - with the business itself, then Vinal 
and I would, if there were good profits, then we were 
. to divide the profits.. 
"Q. Then you-
"A. Over and above after the expenses were taken 
out. 
"Q. When you would get your money back, and 
then you would divide the profits. 
"A. What do you mean, get my money back? 
"·Q. Well, you had to buy the property. 
"A. The property wasn't considered. 
"Q. That wasn't considered? 
"A. The property wasn't considered in my own 
mind. It wasn't talked about that way. We talked about 
the proceeds from the Trailer Court only (Dep. G. L. 
P. 8, ex. 4). 
Defendant further indicated that she understood Plaintiff's 
contribution to the partnership as indicated by her testimony: 
"A. Well, he didn't have any money, and I knew 
it, and I \vas "·illing to buy property in my name. and 
upon the property start a Trailer ·Court or a business 
that he and I could venture into and maybe make some 
money. 
"Q. And \vhat were to be - what did you say \vas 
to be his contribution? 
"A. His contribution \vas to manage and to build 
up the Trailer Court to a profitable business. 
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"Q. Was he to perform work? 
"A. He was to perform work and in return he 
was getting the receipts and paying miscellaneous opera-
tion expenses. 
"Q. Now, this is the ag-reement as you entered 
into it in Moab is it? 
"A. In Moab, yes" (Rec. P. 84, 85). 
Thus the Trial Court had before it conflicting testimony 
as to the inclusion of the property as partnership assets, how-
ever, both parties agreed that the profits from the operation 
of the Trailer Court would be divided between them and in 
addition both parties paid the bills incurred by the business. 
From this evidence the Trial Court concluded, in favor of the 
Defendant, that the property purchased was not an asset of the 
partnership and that only the profits of the business and the 
actual buildings of the business were subject to an accounting 
While it is true that the Plaintiff withdrew monthly sums 
for his personal expenses it was understood by the Defendant 
that these sums would be part of the business expenses since 
Plaintiff was to devote his full time and effort to the construc-
tion and operation of the business, thereby requiring certain 
living expenses, and that any profit from the business thereafter 
would be divided. This is evidenced by Defendant's testimony 
found on page 2 3 of her deposition. (Dep. G. L. ex. 4): 
"Q. Now did you ever agree to pay him a salary 
or much per day? 
"A. No, there wasn't any agreement. 
"Q. How was he to be compensated for his ef-
forts? 
"A. From the receipts from the trailer court. 
"Q. He was to have all the receipts? 
9 
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"A. If there were any profits over and above 
then we were - which he never said there were - well 
we just didn't talk about it. He said there wasn't enough 
money, and he used them to pay this and that and the 
other, and so profits weren't even talked about. We 
thought that maybe it might build up into something 
better than it was." 
We are certainly in accord with the testimony stated in 
40 Am. Jur. Sec. 43, P. I 56, as quoted in Appellant's Brief, 
Page I 4, since the intention of the parties to operate this busi-
ness as partners were understood by them and known by mem-
bers of Defendant's family (R. IOI ). 
At no place during the trial below did Plaintiff introduce 
any evidence concerning the receipts and expenditures, other 
than those expenditures personally made by them and introduced 
by oral testimony, the only documentary evidence on these 
matters were introduced by the Defendant. From the record 
it is shown the Plaintiff did not know what receipts and ex-
penditures the Plaintiff received and made since the Defendant 
"just looked over the books and take- and do some of the col-
lecting herself, take the money and I suppose it was all thrown 
in the same bag, you know" (Record page 66) Defendant's 
brief, wherein she states, on page I 7, that "the records of ex-
penditures placed in evidence by the Plaintiff accounting for 
expenditures of $94 7. 1 3 (R. I 8 5) is in error, since Defendant \vas 
the one introducing the · evidence. Plaintiff never received nor 
was he shown a profit and loss statement, or any accounting 
until the trial of this matter, and in fact had no knowledge of 
any profit made by the business until Defendant's income tax 
return for 1 9 55 was introduced into evidence. 
From the evidence it is apparent that the parties entered 
into an agreement to operate the business as a partnership with 
the Defendant furnishing the basic property and funds and the 
10 
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Phiin;tiff -constructing and ~commencing operation of the Trailer 
Court. Further, the evidence supports the Trial Court's find-
ings. that there was a partnership and that it was an existence 
· during the period complained of by the Plainti~f. 
POINT IL 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING THAT IN 
JULY, ·1955, THE PARTIES HAD AN ACCOUNTING AS 
. TO INCOME RECEIVED AND EXPENDITURES MADE 
AS OF THAT TI1\1E· · WITHOUT THE BUSINESS 
ASSOCIATION OF THE PARTIES BEING DISSOLVED 
AND TERMINATED. 
By its findings the ·Trial Court ruled that in July, 195 5, 
~he .parties had an. accounting· and. employed a third person to 
operate the business for them (Finding 7 R. 1 88). 
Plaintiff maintains that there was no termination of the 
partnership in July, 1955, but that he, "after an absence from his 
wife for about 1 5 months, only qesired to go home for_ a short 
·pe~i?d. and that he .. would_ renir~ in about 2. months" to continue 
operatio~s. · Pl~intiff further contends that when he left the 
busine~ in July that everything .was ready for full operation 
and that the business should show real profits thereafter and 
t~at "he expt:cted to enjoy for. his lab~r and troubles, one half 
of the profits of the business (Dep. V. M. page 2 3-24, ex. 2). 
.. Both parties had contributed a· good deal, Plaintiff his tin1e 
and labor and Defendant her money, in order to build the busi-
ness to its operating condition in July, 1955. It is inconceivable 
to believe that Plaintiff, just at the time when the real profits 
were to be ·made from. the business would call everything even 
between himself and the Defendant and leave the fruits of his 
labor to the Defendant. 
11 
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In addition Plaintiff · had established a credit rating with 
the various businesses of ·Moab in order to carry on the con-
struction and operation of the Trailer Court and it was pri-
marily of ?is respon~ibility to discharge the obligation created 
by reason of such credit even though the debts were those 
of the partnership (Dep. V. M.P. 18). 
Both. parties understood their business relationship and 
since each had paid obligations of the business it can readily be 
assumed that they each recognized their responsibilities for the 
partnersh_ip obligations. The fact that the defendant personally 
paid some of the obligations is not surprising since she agreed 
to furnish funds for the business as her contribution (Dep. V. 
M. P. 20). Plaintiff did not consider himself absolved from 
an.y responsibility for the. debts of the partnership after July, 
1 9 55. In fact, the Plaintiff recognized that the business was, at 
that time, finally in a position to make money, and that the bills 
owing on . the construction had been settled and the business 
was in a p~sition to pay them some profits (Rec. P. 59). 
,It appears that Defendant was the one who kept the books 
and· records of the business and in view of the fact that the 
·Defendant introduced evidence covering a period ending in 
December, 1956, the Trial Court could only make its findings 
based upon that evidence. The evidence did not show a diss~lu­
tion of the partnership even as of the Trial Date, and the Court 
indicated by its Conclusions of Law that the partnership would 
be dissolved when the assets thereof were disposed of in ac-
cordance with the Court's Decree (Conclusion of Law, 2, Rec. 
P. 188). 
It is submitted that the partnership has not been termin-
ated by mutual consent or otherwise and that there still exists 
a partnership agreement between the parties. 
12 
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POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN MAKING DISTRI-
BUTION O·F THE PARTNERSHIP ASSETS IN THE 
MANNER ADJUDGED. 
While it is true that Ira Millet testified that he furnished 
material for the construction of cabins on the property involved 
herein, and while he had not been paid for the material, the 
Trial Court had before it the testimony of Ira Millet that he 
had furnished the material as a partner and that he did not ex-
pect to get paid for the value of the material in the same way as 
if he had sold it to someone (R. 7 5). Reasonably it can there-
fore be assumed that the Trial Court did not place Ira Millet 
in that group of Creditors to be protected by Sec. 48-1-37, Utah 
Code Anno. 1953. 
Defendant relies largely upon the figures presented by het 
at the trial, which figures were based upon an audit conducted 
by an auditing firm employed by her. Although this audit was 
conducted by a Certified Public Accountant, the audit could 
not be certified to be correct because the records were too in-
complete (R. P. 148). In view of this, the Court accepted De-
fendant's income tax returns as being true, rather than to rely 
upon the purported audit submitted (R. 135 ). Based upon the 
returns the Court reached its Conclusions concerning the profits 
made by the partnership business. 
In ordering the distribution of the partnership assets the 
Trial Court considered the fact that the parties had accounted 
to each other in July, 1955, and that distribution should be made 
only of. profits made after that date. Plaintiff made no with-
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Assuming that the figures present by Defendant's audit on 
page I 84 of the record are correct, and giving the Defendant 
th~ benefit of payments made, we find that from July, I955, 
to December 3 I' I 9 s6, the business. had a gross me orne of. $9,-
429.22. 
"Business disbursements'' for the same period were S7 ,-
I 2 I. so. Other disbursements other than land payments and in-
terest thereon, which would be excluded since the land was not 
part of the partnership asse_ts, including for Defendant's benefit, 
the taxes paid on the Ian~, amounted to $7 I I .42, subtracting the 
total disbursements from the gross. income, leaves a net profit of 
$I ,596. 30, which indicates if the Court erred that it did so in 
favor of the Defendant. 
Defendant complains that the Trial Court erred in grant-
ing an IN PERSONUM money judgment against the Defend-
ant, and cites the general rule stated in STEINER vs. GOLD-
STEIN, I 29 Cal. App. 2nd, 682, 278 P. 2nd, 22. We do not dis-
pute the general rule cited, however, there has been recognized 
an exception thereto where there are no debts or liabilities to 
settle except as between the partners themselves, such course -
the sale of partnership assets, payment of debts and a final 
accounting - is _not necesary. HOOPER vs. BARRANTI, I84 
P. 2d 688, HARPER vs. LAMPING, 33 Cal. 64I, I76 P. 447· 
From the evidence it appears that the Trial Coun's order of 
distribution was equitable and just and well within the excep-
tion above noted. In order to establish an equitable distribution 
of the property of the partnership the Court relied upon the 
occupying claimants Statutes, Utah Code Ann., I953, (Sees. 
57-6-1 through 8) as a realistic method of distribution thereby 
affording either party the opportunity of continuing the opera-
tion of the business. It does not force Defendant to sell her prop-
14 
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erty yet it does insure that she does not gain at her partner's 
expense. 
It is true that the Trial Court made no Finding on the 
question of third party liabilities, however, it may be presumed 
that the absence of a specific finding concerning that particular 
point indicates that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant 
it. 
Calloway vs. Twin City Creamery Co. 
190 Wash. 173, 67 P. 2d 329; 
MacDiarmid vs. McDevitt, 
97 Cal. App. 414, 275 P. soo. 
It does not necessarily infer a finding against the Plaintiff. 
POINT IV. 
THE JUDGEMENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE FIND-
INGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
MUST STAND. 
From the facts and evidence outlined in the foregoing 
Point the Plaintiff submits to this Court that the judgment of 
the Trial Court is supported by the Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law a_pd that_ the judgment as rendered is an equit-
able distribution of partnership profits and assets. 
15 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff submits that the evidence establishes a partner~hip 
between t~e parties and that a distribution of the assets and 
an accounting of the profits is necessary and that the Trial 
Court had before it sufficient testimony and evidence to sup-
port the judgment entered in Plaintiff's favor. 
The Plaintiff therefore prays that this Court will affirm 
the judgment of the lower Court, holding that there exists be-
tween the parties a partnership that the assets of such partnership 
should be equally distributed between the parties and that the 
Plaintiff should be awarded judgment against the Defendant 
for one-half of the profits from the operation of the partner-
ship business as found by the Trial Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DANSIE AND ELLETT 
Robert Rees Dansie 
Walter R. Ellett 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Murray, Utah 
4762 South State Street, 
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